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1. Introduction  
This paper presents an analysis of the relationship between the recent movement towards 
full consolidation in financial supervision and the institutional role of the central bank. We 
propose a path dependence approach to study the single-authority versus multi-authority 
dilemma, considering the level of financial supervision consolidation as the dependent 
variable. The work can be useful for evaluating the current worldwide situation, using a 
sample of 48 countries.  
The starting point is the increasing integration of the banking, securities and insurance 
markets, as well as their products and instruments (blurring effect)1. The blurring effect 
produced the crisis of the traditional sectoral approach to supervision, denoting that a 
country’s financial system is overseen on a sector – by – sector basis. The financial blurring 
process seems to call for unification of supervision (single financial authority, SFA).  
The success of the SFA model seems to be growing, particularly in the European area. 
Among the 15 old members of the European Union, Austria (2002), Belgium (2004), 
Denmark (1988), Germany (2002), Sweden (1991), and the UK (1997) have chosen to 
delegate the supervision to a single authority, different from the central bank. The single 
supervisor has been adopted also in four new EU member countries – Estonia (1999), 
Hungary (2000), Latvia (1998), Malta (2002) – as well as in Norway (1986) and Iceland 
(1988). Outside Europe a unified agency was established in Kazakhstan (2004), Korea (1997), 
Japan (2001) and Nicaragua (1999) and, among the small countries, in Bahrain, Bermuda, 
Cayman Islands, Gibraltar, Maldives, Netherlands Antilles, Singapore and United Arab 
Emirates. On the other hand, in Ireland (2003) the supervisory responsibilities were 
concentrated in the hands of the central bank.  
                                                 
1  See, among others, European Commission (2002), De Luna Martinez and Rose (2003), Zwet (2003). 
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However, the picture would be incomplete without recognizing the counter-evidence. 
Masciandaro (2004) showed that the two most frequent supervisory models are polarized: on 
the one hand, countries with a high unification of powers display a low central bank 
involvement in supervision (Single Financial Authority Regime); on the other hand, countries 
with a low concentration of powers are characterized by high central bank supervisory 
responsibilities (Central Bank Dominated Multiple Supervisors Regime).  
What drives financial supervision reform? Which is the central bank’s role in this 
process? Masciandaro (2005) highlighted empirically the existence of a trade off between 
supervision unification and central bank involvement, the so-called central bank 
fragmentation effect, while Masciandaro (2006) discussed this effect using three different 
potential explanations: moral hazard effect, bureaucracy effect and reputation endowment 
effect. If a low central bank involvement is the status quo, the policymaker is not likely to 
increase it, to avoid moral hazard phenomena in the controlled intermediaries (moral hazard 
effect), or an increase in the bureaucratic powers of the central bank (bureaucracy effect). An 
increased unification level may be achieved by creating a new single financial authority. 
If a high central bank involvement is the status quo, the policymaker may not wish to 
unify the supervision in the hands of the central bank for the same reasons (moral hazard and 
bureaucracy effects). At the same time, the policymaker may not be in a position to establish 
a new single financial authority, reducing the central bank involvement in supervision, if the 
central bank’s reputation is high (reputation endowment effect).  
In the paper, we go a little further and try to explain the reasons behind the central 
bank fragmentation effect and the corresponding effects. Parallel to the blurring effect in the 
financial markets, central banks all over the world have gained an increasing degree of 
independence from the political process. We identify legal proxies of two different potential 
causes, namely bureaucracy effect and reputation endowment effect, that could explain the 
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decision of the policymaker to maintain or reform the supervision responsibility of the 
monetary authority. We wish to test the hypothesis that, when supervision is assigned to 
central banks, the central banker enjoys a higher degree of bureaucratic power and/or 
reputation endowment owing to central bank independence. For this purpose we adopt 
monetary commitment and central bank independence indexes, using and elaborating the 
indicators discussed in Freytag (2001). 
It is not surprising to discover that monetary legal indicators - and particularly the 
central bank independence - matter. In industrialised countries the relationship between 
independence and control over inflation seemed sufficiently robust and convincing; see the 
recent surveys in Berger et al. (2001) and Hayo and Hefeker (2002). Here we focus on the 
possible role of monetary legal indicators as institutional determinants of the choice of a 
financial supervisory structure. The policy implications are also relevant, particularly in the 
European Union context: Does the current existence of an independent European Central 
Bank affect the likelihood of the creation of a Single European Financial Supervisor?  
The paper is organized as follows. Section two presents a path dependence approach to 
study the single authority versus multi-authority dilemma, considering the level of financial 
supervision consolidation as the dependent variable. The financial authorities concentration 
index (FAC Index) is used in section three to identify this dependent variable. In section three 
we highlight the importance of the role the central bank plays in the various national 
supervisory settings, using the fact that the degree of supervision unification seems to be 
inversely correlated with the central bank’s involvement in supervision itself as a starting 
point. Section four discusses the possible explanation of this trade-off, stressing three 
potential causes: moral hazard effect, bureaucracy effect and reputation endowment effect. 
Section five introduces monetary commitment and central bank independence indicators as 
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consistent proxies of the reputation endowment effect and bureaucracy effect respectively. In 
section six, an econometric analysis is performed. Section seven puts forward some 
conclusions as well as perspectives for further research. 
 
2. Explaining the Financial Supervision Regime: A Path Dependence Approach 
Goodhart (2004) wondered if the development of financial supervision architecture is 
designed or accidental. It has been argued regularly and frequently that the design of 
supervision is essentially reactive, lagging behind innovation and evolving risks, and that the 
reasons for supervisory reforms are largely political. We claim that the evolution of financial 
supervision is not accidental. To justify this, we investigate the determinants that should lead 
a country to reform or to maintain the supervisory regime, with particular attention to the role 
of the central bank. 
Our basis is that in each point of time, gains and losses of a supervisory model are 
expected variables, calculated by the policymakers that maintain or reform the supervisory 
regime. But the expectations of policymakers are likely to be influenced by structural 
economic and institutional variables, which may vary from country to country. Therefore, 
given the national economic and institutional endowment, these variables can determine, 
ceteris paribus, the policymaker’s expected gains or losses of a specific supervisory regime. 
The supervisory regime can become the dependent variable in a path dependence framework. 
Furthermore, economic agents do not have perfect information on the true preferences of the 
policymaker: his/her optimal degree of  supervision unification is a hidden variable. 
The crucial issue is the identification of the policymaker’s preferences. In the economic 
literature, there is lack of theoretical studies that consider the policymaker’s objective 
function for the financial supervisory design. The first approach to identify the policymaker’s 
